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Beatty: Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.

RECENT DECISIONS
COURT AUTHORIZED BLOOD TRANSFUSION OVER ADULT PATIENT'S RELIGIOUS OBJECTION-A VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT?-Petitioner

entered Georgetown University hospital in Washington, D. C., for emergency care of a ruptured ulcer. The hospital staff concluded that death

would be imminent without blood transfusions, but permission to administer them was refused by both the patient and her husband. Counsel for
the hospital applied to a federal district judge for permission to administer blood but the judge denied the application. Counsel then applied to
a judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals for an appropriate
writ. Petitioner's husband explained to the appellate judge that his own
and his wife's religious beliefs made it impossible to approve of the blood
transfusion,' but said if the court so ordered, it would not be his responsibility. The judge next attempted to speak with petitioner, but in her
weakened condition, her only remark was "Against my will." He then
signed an order allowing the hospital to administer sufficient blood to save
her life. The transfusions were administered, and the patient recovered.

Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.,
331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
Petitioner later filed a petition for a rehearing en bane by the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, and for an order vacating and
quashing the order issued by the appellate judge which authorized the
transfusions, contending that she was still subject to that order. Held:
2
Petition denied per curiam with one concurrence and four dissents.
Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.,
331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
'Both the patient and her husband were Jehovah's Witnesses. Among other tenets,
this sect finds a Biblical prohibition against the taking of blood. This belief is said
to be based upon passages in their Bible such as: "For the soul of every sort of
flesh is its blood by the soul in it. Consequently I say to the sons of Israel: 'You
must not eat the blood of any sort of flesh, because the soul of every sort of flesh
is its blood. Anyone eating it will be cut off.' '" Leviticus 17:14. Their refusal of
transfusions is also based upon such other passages as Leviticus 17:10, 3:17; Genesis
9:3, 4; Acts 15:28, 29. All these refer in some way to the "eating"
of blood.
In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 185 N.E.2d 128 (1962); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J.
463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962). For a more detailed study on the history and beliefs of
this sect, see Mulder, Jehovah's Witnesses Mold ConstitutionalLaw, 2 BILL OF RIGHTS
REV. 262 (1942).
'The appellate judge granting the temporary order wrote the opinion reported in 331
F.2d 1000. The opinion of the full court denying the petition for rehearing appears
at 331 F.2d 1010. Both these opinions will be considered in this note. In each of
them, it is made clear that this controversy was not decided upon its merits. The
appellate judge granted the order under an "All Writs" statute; 28 U.S.C. § 1651
(1958). In denying the petition, the full court questioned the judge's ability to
grant the temporary order under this statute, and other procedural aspects, and
hence, never touched upon the merits. The petition was denied on the basis that the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was not properly invoked and the controversy
was obviously moot by the time the petition was filed, since the order was temporary.
For a complete analysis of this aspect, see 77 HARV. L. RaV. 1539 (1964). However,
a discussion of the underlying constitutional issue presented by the facts of this
case will be the subject of this note.
Although the filing of the petition for rehearing is puzzling, it may be that the
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The extent to which the state has power to control the exercise of
religious beliefs and practices has historically presented a difficult question. The inviolability of the first amendment to the Constitution requires
a delicate touch in handling religious questions. Courts have been hesitant
to decide religious exercise questions except when forced by the circumstances of the case. However, a basic method of analysis has emerged and
is generally used in deciding religious questions arising under the first
amendment. It is a two-fold approach which calls for a determination of,
first, whether the application of a statute imposes any burden upon the
exercise of religion, and second, if it does, whether some compelling state
interest justifies the infringement.3 Almost all cases deciding the religious issue involve the constitutionality of a statute that limits the freedom of religious exercise. In the instant case there was, of course, no
statute requiring the patient to submit to blood transfusions. In this
respect the case is less analogous to previous authority. Even so, the
state's compelling interest is not limited to that in enacted statutes, and
the important consideration becomes one of whether the state had a
compelling interest on any grounds.
A problem arises in defining the "compelling state interest," which
is to be balanced against the awesome weight of the individual's constitutional guarantees. 4 While no concrete definition of compelling state interest has been propounded, it is recognized that the state may have a
compelling interest in religious practice but not in religious belief. The
United States Supreme Court and lower courts have generally agreed that
5
although religious beliefs may not be prohibited, religious practices may.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals would apparently uphold this approach
even though the only person endangered by the practice would be the
practitioner. Judge Tilford of that court in an opinion on this matter
said, "it is apparent that the Federal Constitution does not preclude a
state from enacting a law prohibiting the practice of a religious rite
which endangers the lives, health or safety of the participants, or
other persons." 6 However, the California Supreme Court in People v.
patient brought the petition for its publicity value or to make the point that she
was not subject to the jurisdiction of this court. This at least may be a possible
reason, as competent counsel would surely realize that petitioner was no longer
subject to a temporary order issued to authorize such blood transfusions "as necessary to save her life" after she had fully recovered.
'Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
4See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963); American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California v. Board of
Education, 10 Cal. Rptr. 647, 359 P.2d 45 (1961); Wollam v. City of Palm Springs,
29 Cal. Rptr. 1, 379 P.2d 481 (1963).
'See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); In re Jenison, 375 U.S. 14

(1963) ; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) ; Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590,

155 A.2d 684 (1959).
'Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942).

This case con-

cerned a defendant who used poisonous snakes to demonstrate that because of his
religious belief, they would not bite him, or if they did, he would not be harmed.

These demonstrations usually took place in "revival"

meetings, among a group of

other persons. Therefore, in such a situation, there is always the chance that even

though the participant is handling the snake, there will be considerable danger to
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Woody,' specifically exempted from this approach the use of a drug pro-

hibited by narcotics statute because the court felt such use was not a harmful practice. Since the use was not harmful, and the drug, peyote, was used
in a bona fide religious practice, the narcotics statute could not prevent its
use. The court utilized the analysis suggested above, and concluded there
was no compelling state interest because use of the drug had no permanent deleterious effect upon the user, and the morals of those persons
using peyote religiously were not impaired thereby.8
The facts of the instant case are even further removed from the scope
of compelling state interest than those in the Woody case. They present
the additional question of whether petitioner's refusal was a religious
practice or a religious belief. Here, there was no rite, ritual or overt
action which would endanger the patient or others. It was, arguably, only
a refusal to accept help from others, which would hardly fall into the

category of a dangerous religious practice.
Within the limits of the compelling state interest, three distinct tests
have emerged which the courts utilize in finding such an interest. These
approaches are grounded in the (1) Public Health, Safety and Morals, (2)
the Criminal Law, and (3) the Parens Patriae doctrine.
Public Health, Safety and Morals

It is accepted as fundamental that the state may pass laws for the
protection of the public at large, 9 and by this reasoning, it has been held
that general public health laws are constitutional.' 0 The courts also have
the power to order compulsory medical treatment or confinement for

persons with communicable diseases, and to require vaccination."

Thus,

other persons close to him. Even though the court speaks of the law applying to a
person participating, the rule should not be extended to any practice less exotic than
this.
'People v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
8
1d. at 74.
From this decision, it seems that the use of peyote in religious practices is
lawful, but its use outside religion is still illegal. In the one case in Montana that
has arisen on this point, the Montana Supreme Court held that the constitution
section guaranteeing free exercise of religion could not be invoked as a protection
against a Montana statute prohibiting the possession of peyote under the claim that
it was possessed and used in a church for sacramental purposes. State v. Big Sheep,
75 Mont. 219, 243 Pac. 1067 (1926). See Laws of Montana 1923, ch. 22, § 1 at 40.
However, in 1957, this statute was amended, and a proviso clause added that specifically allows the use or possession of peyote for bona fide religious sacremental
purposes. See REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 94-35-123. Hereafter REVISED
CODES OF MONTANA will be cited R.C.M.
City of Little Rock v. Smith, 204 Ark. 692, 163 S.W.2d 705 (1942) ; Patrick v. Riley,
209 Cal. 350, 287 Pac. 455 (1930); State ex rel. Mowrer v. Underwood, 137 Ohio St.
1, 27 N.E.2d 773 (1940).
1
OPacific Coast Dairy v. Department of Agriculture, 19 Cal. 2d 818, 123 P.2d 442
(1942) ; Coelho v. Truckell, 9 Cal. App. 2d 697 (1935) ; Patrick v. Riley, supra note
9; Moore v. Draper, 57 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1952).
"Moore v. Draper, supra note 11; Mosier v. Board of Health, 308 Ky. 829, 215 S.W.2d
967 (1948) ; Board of Education v. Maas, 56 N.J. Super. 245, 152 A.2d 394 (1959);
In re Whitmore, 47 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. City 1944). R.C.M. 1947, §
69-709 provides:
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so far as the lives of the mass of its citizens are concerned, the state has
a compelling interest. The interest is, as a general rule, limited to the
mass and does not extend to the individual citizen. 12 This is pointed out
by the Wisconsin court in Benz v. Kremer." In that case, the criterion
used to determine whether a public health statute was a legitimate
exercise of power, was whether the public health in general would be
promoted, and not whether it would be promoted in isolated cases. For
example, the spreading of a deadly communicable disease could economically cripple an entire area. The panics usually accompanying such
epidemics hardly tend to promote good order and general public safety.
The patient here was clearly outside the scope of these reasons for
the compelling state interest. Her death would neither be a great economic loss to the public as a whole nor would it cause any measurable
panic. It would be no basis for fears concerning public health or safety
that would justify judicial interference.
Courts have also seen fit to regulate religious practice when it was
obviously contrary to public morals. The case Re'ynolds v. United States
is probably the most often quoted example.' 4 The United States Supreme
Court found that both legally and morally the practice of polygamy was
repugnant and unacceptable. 15 In the instant case, it could be argued that
the patient's refusal of medical assistance in the face of almost sure death
was "immoral." However, it would seem that the more liberal courts of
today would not find this sufficiently immoral for a decision analogous
to Reynolds. The present case is even less analogous to Reynolds when it is
remembered that here there is no applicable statute to serve as a guidepost to the public mores.
Whenever smallpox exists or is threatened in any part of the state, the state
board of health shall have authority to require all persons frequenting any
schoolhouse within the infected or threatened district to be vaccinated, or to
present evidence of a successful vaccination with cowpox, and no person shall
be permitted to enter any schoolhouse within the district included in the order
of the state board of health unless such requirements are complied with.
'2 There are exceptions to this view. Cf., Lawson v. Commonwealth, supra note 6.
13142 Wis. 1, 125 N.W. 99 (1910). The case arose when Kremer, the state bakery inspector refused to grant Benz a bakery license because the floor of his bakery was
more than five feet below street level, which was against a state health law. Benz
contended that since the purpose of the statute was sanitation, and his facilities were
as sanitary as any other, the statute was inapplicable and unconstitutional. The
court held that the individual case cannot determine the necessity for a general law
on the subject, and stated this to be the rule. Notice here, however, that the law
is one which was made not for the protection of Benz, but for the health of the
public in general. Thus, an individual should not be held under a public health statute
unless it will promote public health, not merely the health of the individual concerned.
It would seem then, that the state should not have the power to control health
measures when only the health of the individual is concerned.
"98 U.S. 145 (1879).
aThe Court first found in the Reynolds case, that under the first amendment it could
reach actions in violation of social duties or subversive of good order. The Court
then faced the question of whether polygamy was licentious. It found that the practice was historically limited to Asiatic and African people, while odious in northern
and western Europe. England had always treated it as offense against society, and
Virginia, in 1788, had made it punishable by death. From this, the conclusion was
that polygamy was licentious and that the Court could act against it, even though
it had been practiced under the guise of religious liberty.
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Criminal Sanctions and Statutes.
Like public health statutes, criminal laws are enacted for the protection of the public. It has been held that there is no religious exception
to criminal laws. 16 The Court in the Reynolds case illustrated this idea,
using the example of a religion advocating human sacrifice or suicide.
The Court stated that it would not be outside the scope of civil government to prevent the practice of such a religion. This "no exception" rule
is probably based on the reasoning that the Constitution does not grant
special privileges to persons of any particular religious belief, merely
because they hold that belief.' 7 In other words, the courts look through
the religious belief to see if one outside religion would be allowed to perform the particular act.' 8 If not, then justification of the act based upon
religious belief will not overcome the prohibitory statute. Utilizing this
approach, the courts find no problem in controlling a religious practice
that requires the commission of a crime, and religious practices have
19
thereby been limited under murder and manslaughter statutes.
The question of attempted suicide in refusing medical aid would vary
with the particular state statutes involved. In those states which have no
laws replacing the common law on this point, the person refusing may be
guilty of a felony. Montana's statute,20 unlike the District of Columbia
Code, requires only the killing of a human being, so it could possibly be
extended to a "suicide" committed on religious grounds. The applicable
District of Columbia Code 2' section requires the killing of "another," and
would therefore make it more difficult to include the instant case within
its scope. However, even if the common law or a statute expressly makes
attempted suicide illegal, the additional problem of criminal intent presents
itself. A person relying upon a hospital to heal him has the intent to get
15Beynolds v. United States, supra note 14, at 167.
"Although courts seldom specifically state this rule, it seems to permeate the thinking
in the majority of eases. Mr. Justice Jackson, in a case also concerning a Jehovah's

Witness, stated the basic rationale:
In my view, the First Amendment assures the broadest tolerable exercise of
free speech, free press, and free assembly, not merely for religious purposes, but
for political, economic, scientific, news, or informational ends as well. When limits
are reached which such communication must observe, can one go farther under
the cloak of religious evangelism? Does what is obscene, or commercial, or
abusive, or inciting become less so if employed to promote a religious ideology?
I had not supposed that the rights of secular and non- religious communications
were more narrow or in any way inferior to those of avowed religious groups.
It may be asked why then does the First Amendment separately mention
free exercise of religion? The history of religious persecution gives the answer
.... It was to assure religious teaching as much freedom as secular discussion,
rather than to assure it greater license, that led to its separate statement.
Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 179 (1943). (Emphasis added.)
"Note that the Woody case, supra note 7, does not follow this reasoning. Another
example would be the exception granted to religions for the use of wine for sacramental purposes when the eighteenth amendment was in effect.
"Craig v. State, supra note 5.
2
R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2501 provides in part:
"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. ",
"D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2401 (1961) provides in part:
of murder . . ..
. .is guilty
Published by ScholarWorks
University
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well, not to commit suicide. For example, if he refuses to submit to surgery out of fear, it cannot be said that he has the intention of comitting
suicide. This is further complicated by the absence of an overt act in
cases where there is only a refusal to accept aid of a particular kind.
In the instant case, the patient is outside the scope of the criminal
laws. Both intent and overt act are lacking. Petitioner did not wish to
die; she wanted to live. 22 By her refusal, she would not have caused her
death, but merely would have allowed a contingency to occur. Therefore,
her refusal was beyond any statutory or common law prohibition against
suicide.
The question of the liability of petitioner's husband is not so readily
answered. Under present law in Montana, he might have been held liable
for manslaughter. In State v. Mally, 21 the Montana Supreme Court held a
husband liable under the manslaughter statute 24 for failure to provide
medical care for his wife after she had broken her arm. The court based
its holding on the husband's duty to care for his wife, and stated, "the
conclusion is inescapable that the failure to obtain medical aid for one
who is owed a duty is a sufficient degree of negligence as to constitute
involuntary manslaughter provided death results from the failure to act."'25
It is questionable whether a result such as this could be upheld in the
District of Columbia concerning petitioner's husband. The District of
Columbia Codes do not expressly define involuntary manslaughter, and
convictions for this offense have generally been obtained under the negligent homicide statutes. 26 However, the negligent homicide statutes are
concerned with automobiles used as instrumentalities of death. 2' The best
analogy to the instant case would be the child support cases under the
'The facts of the case itself present a strong inference that petitioner had no suicidal
intent. In his opinion, the appellate judge pointed out the fact that she came to
the hospital for help, and that death was not a religiously-commanded goal but an
unwanted side-effect of a religious scruple. Both she and her husband indicated that
although they could not authorize the transfusion, if the court authorized it, it would
not be their responsibility. These facts weighed together, while far from conclusive,
point less to a suicidal intent than to a will to live.
2139 Mont. 599, 366 P.2d 868 (1961).
IR.C.M. 1947, § 94-2507 provides in part:
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice.
It is of two kinds:
2. Involuntary, in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to
felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an
unlawful manner, or without due caution or circumspection.
EState v. Mally, supra note 23, at 606, 366 P.2d at 872.
2D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-2401 to 2405 (1961). Under this statute, manslaughter has
been defined only as "the unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought."
United States v. Edmonds, 63 F. Supp. 968 (1946); Fryer v. United
States, 93 U.S. App. D.C. 34, 207 F.2d 134 (1953); and an involuntary manslaughter
conviction was upheld for driving an automobile in a criminally careless manner.
Story v. United States, 57 U.S. App. D.C. 3, 16 F.2d 342 (1926). However, in that
case, there was no mere omission, but a recklessly negligent commission. These cases
define manslaughter as existing where the killing is unlawful, but no suggestion is
made that manslaughter may be a lawful act that produces death in an unlawful
manner. But of. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2507.
'D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-606 -607 (1961).
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol26/iss1/5
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statutes raising that duty. 28 If the same result could be reached, it would
involve interpretation of dissimilar statutes and a considerable extension
of their applicability.
Parens Patriae
The doctrine of parens patriae is perhaps the broadest base upon which
courts have found a compelling state interest. At common law, the king
was the guardian of all those persons who for some reason were unfit
to manage their own affairs. The United States adopted this doctrine with
the state, rather than the king, as the sovereign guardian. 29 The application of this doctrine has historically been confined to minors and persons adjudged to be incompetent, such as insane persons, habitual drunk30
ards and others non sui juris.
An early case held that the doctrine was also limited by the common
law principle of reasonable necessity. 3 ' This limitation dovetails with the
requirement of compelling state interest, since the state usually has no
compelling interest unless the action to be taken is both reasonable and
necessary.
The modern application of this doctrine to freedom of religion can
best be seen in the cases involving children. As children began to acquire
more legally enforceable rights in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
courts began to uphold certain of these rights under the parens patriae
32
doctrine, even though they conflicted with freedom of religious practice.
The Ohio Domestic Relations Court, in a case concerning a blood transfusion of a three year old child, held that when a child's right to live and
his parents' religious belief collide, the right to life is paramount, and
the religious doctrine must give way.3 3 Other courts have ordered blood
transfusions for an unborn child certain to have an RH blood factor
problem, 34 and for a "blue baby" voluntarily admitted to the hospital by
its parents. 35 The objections to the transfusions in the above cases were
made by Jehovah's Witnesses, on religious grounds. The courts had little
trouble finding a compelling interest based upon parens patriae to override this religious objection. Although it is well settled that the doctrine
takes precedence when applied to children, the instant case raises the
question of whether it may be extended to include adults.
"D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-902 to 904 (1961).
2See, e.g., Helton v. Crawley, 241 Iowa 296, 41 N.W.2d 60 (1950); In re Turner, 94
Kan. 115, 145 Pac. 871 (1915).
mSee, e.g., McIntosh v. Dill, 86 Okla. 1, 205 Pac. 917 (1922); Johnson v. State, 18
N.J. 422, 114 A.2d 1 (1955).
State v. Ray, 63 N.H. 406 (1884).
12See, e.g., People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952);
Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Kansas City Ct. of App., Mo., 1952).
8In re Clark, supra note 1.
"Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961).
'Statebyv.ScholarWorks
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Until recently, this question has not given the courts a great deal of
trouble. The United States Supreme Court in Prince v. Massachusetts
stated: "Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does
not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of
their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves. 3 6 In the 1903 New
York case of People v. Pierson, one of the leading cases in the child-health
area, Judge Cullen wrote in his concurring opinion:
The state, as parens patriae, is authorized to legislate for the
protection of children. As to an adult (except possibly in the case
of a contagious disease which would affect the health of others),
I think there is no power to prescribe what medical treatment he
shall receive, and that he is entitled to follow his own election,
whether that election be dictated by religious belief or other con37
sideration.
Such broad statements as this are not commonly found in the more recent
cases, and the trend has been to expand the scope of the doctrine to include adults in certain situations. This trend is shown by the decision of
the New Jersey Supreme Court in Johnson v. State.38 Although the facts
concerned a minor who had committed a murder, the court speaks of a
broad doctrine. It discusses the early law, where the scope of the rule was
limited to civil matters relating to contract and property rights of infants and their supervision where necessary, but says the rule is now
much broader.
[It] extends to the personal liberty of persons who are under a
disability whether by reason of infancy, incompetency, habitual
drunkenness, imbecility, etc. . . .This jurisdiction and duty is
called into play when it is found that such persons could be a
danger to themselves or to the public if they are not taken and
held under the protective custody of the sovereign .... The principle that an infant on reaching the age of 21 becames a sui
generis person and therefore no longer a child does not automatically apply to persons who are under a natural disability
such as an incompetent, imbecile or habitual drunkard, and
therefore subject to the parens patriae jurisdiction. .... 3.
In the instant case, the patient's refusal to authorize the blood transfusion made her a danger to herself. The theory of the Johnson case
could possibly be applied to this situation, although the court implies a
lack of choice when it speaks of a "natural" disability. It could be argued
that a disability raised by a religious doctrine which would force one to
-321 U:S. 158, 170" (1944).
8.7176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243, 247 (1903).
M

Johnson v. State, supra note 30..
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choose between the religious doctrine and almost certain death is no more
of a "conscious choice" than that which a habitual drunkard might make.
In a recent case, the New Jersey Supreme Court was again faced with
the problem of an adult refusing a blood transfusion on religious grounds.
The case was decided on the authority of child cases, as the adult was
pregnant. However, the court recognized the existence of the question
and stated:
The more difficult question is whether an adult may be compelled
to submit to such medical procedures when necessary to save his
life. Here we think it is unnecessary to decide that question in
broad terms because the welfare of the child and mother are so
intertwined and inseparable that it would be impracticable to attempt to distinguish between them with respect to the sundry
factual patterns which may develop. The blood transfusions
(including transfusions made necessary by the delivery) may be
administered if necessary to save her life or the life of the child, as
the physician in charge at the time may determine. 40 (Emphasis
added.)
Although the court here does not expressly hold on the question, the
opinion clearly does not limit the transfusions to effectuate the saving
of the child's life only. For example, by the holding of this case, a post
delivery transfusion could conceivably be administered to the mother even
if the child was clearly no longer in danger.
It may be that the extension of the common law parens patriae doctrine to the adult is the best theory upon which religious-medical questions may be determined. In the instant case, certainly, it is not so objectionable as other grounds discussed. Here, the patient wanted to live,
and the inference from the text of the opinion is that she was quite
willing to submit to the transfusion so long as she was not forced to
compromise her religious beliefs. 41 Certainly, from a moral standpoint,
the appellate judge took the proper course of action. The saving of another human being's life, especially when that person wants to live, cannot be condemned on moral grounds.
However, from a legal standpoint, his action cannot be upheld. As
much as the expansion of this doctrine would help under the present
facts, it is submitted that it is too dangerous to be allowed as precedent.
To condone this expansion in any general way it would have to be argued
that in certain situations a particular religious belief makes a person
"incompetent" and powerless to help himself, and that the state, as parens
patriae, may assume temporary jurisdiction for the person's own benefit.
This would open the door to further expansion of the state's power to
regulate individuals, and worse, to regulate religious belief. If the state
'°0 Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2013
(N.J. Sup. Ct. June 17, 1964).
"Supra
22.
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could hold a religious belief as making a person incompetent, could not the
state then actually circumvent the constitutional ban on interfering with
the belief itself? The concept of the state stepping into a person's religious life "for his own good" is repugnant to the spirit of the first
amendment.
As the law stands today, there is no legal justification for this kind
of interference, and the expansion of any of the doctrines discussed, in
any general way, would be an excessive infringement upon the personal
liberties of the individual guaranteed under the first amendment.
RICHARD L. BEATTY.

ADDITUR,

AS A MEANS

OF MODIFYING

RECOGNIZED IN MONTNA.-The

A JURY DAMAGE AWARD,

NOT

State of Montana, acting through its State

Highway Commission, plaintiff, condemned land belonging to the defendant. The commission appointed by the parties to appraise the land
awarded defendant $50,000, and plaintiff appealed. A jury awarded defendant $30,000 in district court, whereupon defendant appealed, deeming the award inadequate. Finding a new trial justified on the grounds
of inadequacy,' the trial court judge gave plaintiff the option of either
consenting to entry of judgment in the sum of $37,897.45, in which event
defendant's motion for a new trial would be denied, or granting the motion for retrial. Plaintiff appealed, contending the court had no authority to compel such an election. Held, the trial court abused its discretion
in attempting to exercise the power of additure. State Highway Comm'n
v. Schmidt, 391 P.2d 692 (Mont. 1964).
Additur is the procedure by which the trial court, with the consent
of the defendant, increases the amount of an inadequate jury award, as
a condition to denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial. 2 Remittitur is
the analogous practice used to decrease the amount of a jury verdict.
The two procedures are employed only when the court is in a position to
,REVISED CODES OF MONTANA,

1947 § 93-5603

enumerates the grounds for

a new

trial: II... (5) Excessive damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice; (6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict
or other decision, or that it is against the law. . .. "' While excessive damages is a
ground (subdivision 5), the party who wishes to appeal an inadequate award must
move on the ground of 'insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict," under
subdivision 6. Flaherty v. Butte Electric Ry. Co., 42 Mont. 89, 111 Pac. 348 (1910).
This anomaly is a product of the common law and is discussed in a California decision, Phillips v. Lyon, 109 Cal. App. 264, 292 Pac. 711 (1930). REVISED CODES OF
MONTANA are hereinafter cited R.C.M.
2
For purposes of this discussion, it will be assumed that sufficient grounds exist for
will be defined in the
and 'remittitur"
a new trial. Also, the terms "additur"
conditional sense, i.e., one party is given the option to consent to a modification of
the award, or submitting to a new trial. The option is given to defendant if plaintiff
moves for a new trial, and to plaintiff if defendant so moves. Attempts to go beyond
conditional use and arbitrarily modify damage awards without either party's consent
have been declared unconstitutional. E.g., Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889);
Bourne v. Moore, 77 Utah 184, 292 Pac. 1102 (1930); Borowicz v. Hamann, 193
Wis. 324, 214 N.W. 431 (1927).
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